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Abstract
Purpose – The article explores what forms of disruption are prioritized by top executives of large
manufacturing companies in Finland and what strategies they consider appropriate for the management of
disruptive threats and opportunities.
Design/methodology/approach –The empirical studywas based on interviewswith top executives in some
of Finland’s largest manufacturing companies.
Findings – Based on the data, we identify exploitative and explorative strategies in four dimensions that
executives consider important in anticipating and responding to disruptions: internal development efforts,
stance on new entrants, ecosystems and institutional change. Due to the presence of multiple potential
disruptions, which often generate conflicting demands, executives have to consider them simultaneously and
balance between them when making strategic decisions. They therefore do not necessarily have a specific
response strategy, but their aim is to develop their companies’ capabilities so that they are well-placed to face
the future with confidence.
Originality/value – The findings indicate that the executives envision a disruption landscape that is more
complex than typically described in the literature. In addition, it answers the call for a more systematic
understanding of incumbents’ response strategies by linking different disciplinary views with well-grounded
empirical data.
Keywords Manufacturing industries, Top executives, Management, Strategies, Incumbents,
Disruption, Disruptive innovation
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The recent turbulence in the world economy has highlighted the complex interplay between
various disruptive forces, particularly in the manufacturing industry. Already in the midst of
substantial transformation due to digitalization and increasing sustainability demands, the
industry suddenly seemed to be looking atmultiple possible paths of evolution. Some of these
disruptive forces may accelerate the adoption of radical innovations and the breakdown of
traditional value creation patterns, while others may favour market leaders who have deep
pockets and a strong foothold in the market.
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, it seemed that incumbents were leading the
transformation of manufacturing industry in incremental steps, properly sized for the
change of their organizations. Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence from other
industries that when incumbents focus heavily on incremental innovations that protect their
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opportunities” (e.g. Hagel et al., 2008). These opportunities offer the chance to diverge from
the current sustaining innovation trajectory, which is maintained by industry incumbents
and the institutionalized rules for creating value within the industry. Hence, seizing
disruptive opportunities would require radical renewal of their business and often renewal
capability on the part of business partners and customers as well.
Traditionally disruptive innovation theory (Christensen, 1997, 2006; Christensen et al.,
2018) has focused mainly on technology-driven disruptions, which follow a few particular
disruption patterns (mainly low-end disruption). As a result, the response strategies are
limited and insufficient to proposing solutions in the context of complex management
practice. Although there are numerous other streams of research interested in
complementary disruption patterns, disruption theories are missing a clear ability to link
different mechanism or articulate boundary conditions (Eggers and Park, 2017).
The recent global health and economic crisis has demonstrated that the narrow focus on
disruptive innovation is insufficient to guide companies through the extremely complex
systemic impacts that various disruptive forces may have. This article aims to build a more
comprehensive understanding of the disruption process by describing disruptive forces,
which were identifiable among top executives of the manufacturing industry before the
pandemic. The aim is to shed light on how they perceived potential disruptions and how they
prepared for the future by devising strategies to cope with challenging situations and seize
disruptive opportunities. Since this management perspective represents a broad view on
disruption, the following section summarizes various theoretical contributions which
together can be viewed as building blocks for such a view.
2. Theoretical foundation
2.1 Disruptive innovation theory
Although the phenomenon of technological disruption has long roots in technological
innovation studies, the interest of academics and practitioners only began to mount with the
publication of Christensen’s (1997) book “The Innovator’s Dilemma” (Hopp et al., 2018; Yu and
Hang, 2010). The concept of disruptive technology, later redefined as disruptive innovation,
became the basis for a specific theory focusing on how less-resourced smaller companies, i.e.
entrants, are able to challenge established incumbents (Christensen, 1997, 2006; Christensen
and Raynor, 2003; Christensen et al., 2015).
Since Christensen’s original work, disruptive innovation theory has been the subject of
intense discussion and development. Utterback and Acee (2005) proposed that, in addition to
low-end disruption, there is a high-end disruptive innovation pattern in which “a higher
performing and higher-priced innovation is introduced into the most demanding established
market segments and later moves towards themassmarket”. Although innovation is initially
attractive to a high-end niche, incumbents either overlook it or stumble to respond. Further,
two other types of extension, business model innovation and radical (new-to-the-world)
product innovations (Markides, 2006), have been proposed. Business model innovation states
that disruptive innovation is not only about technological innovation, but business model
innovation is an integral part of the phenomenon. New-to-the-world product innovation was
accepted as a new type of disruptive innovation under the notion of new market disruption
(Christensen, 2006).
Major confusion remains about the phenomenon of disruption and the concept of disruptive
innovation (Sood andTellis, 2011;Weeks, 2015). On the one hand, Christensen et al. (2015) claim
that the concept is used too inaccurately. On the other hand,manypractitioners and researchers
find the original definition problematic, sincemany innovations that arewidely thought to have
dramatically disrupted the market (e.g. Uber or Tesla) are not disruptive innovations in
Christensen’s meaning (Chase, 2016; Schmidt and Druehl, 2008; HBR, 2015).
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Despite these differences, researchers agree that the theory will only be useful if the
terminology is used correctly (Christensen et al., 2015). The definitions frame how we
perceive, analyse and respond to changes in the competitive environment (Gobble, 2016).
Different kinds of innovations, competitors and threats require different strategic responses,
and conceptual ambiguity makes it impossible to identify appropriate responses. Therefore,
we need to find complementary perspectives that together can build a more holistic
understanding of the disruption phenomenon.
2.2 Complementary perspectives on disruption
When disruption is viewed from a broader perspective, there are several scholarly streams
and complementary views (see summary in Table 1) that may help to describe the overall
phenomenon better and to devise strategies on how to cope with different situations.
2.2.1 Incumbents’ failure to change as the main mechanism for disruption. In many
industries the displacement of incumbent firms appears to be driven as much by the success
of entrant firms as by the failure of established firms (Chesbrough, 2001). Henderson (2006)
suggests that the failure of established firms to adopt new innovations and to renew
themselves due to embedded organizational competencies is an important pattern of
disruption. To address this issue, Gans (2016a) makes a distinction between demand-side and
supply-side disruptions.Demand-side disruption follows largely the mainstream narrative on
disruptive innovation, where new market entrants introduce disruptive innovations that
target niche segments, which are initially unattractive to the incumbents. In supple-side
disruption, the mechanisms of disruption are based on changes in organizational
competencies and product architecture (cf. architectural innovation; see Henderson and
Clark, 1990). A new product architecture is seen as a technological discontinuity (Tushman
and Anderson, 1986), or more broadly as a discontinuous innovation requiring the renewal of
organizational competencies, i.e. embedded organizational routines and structures
(Henderson, 2006). However, as incumbents are bound by their established routines and
focus on (incrementally) developing their existing competencies, they become incapable of
sensing needed changes and developing new competencies (Gans, 2016b; Henderson, 2006).
Therefore, the same competencies that may be an organization’s most enduring source of
competitive advantage may become competency traps (Leonard-Barton, 1992), which will
hamper significant organizational change.
Digital disruption can be seen as a modern version of architectural disruption, where
innovation is driven by pervasive processes of digitalization (Yoo et al., 2010). A digital
disruption process starts from digital innovation, which changes the historical logics for
value creation and capture by unbundling, decoupling and recombining linkages among
resources and activities or by generating new ones (Skog et al., 2018; Teixeira and Jamieson,
2014). Although the innovation that initiates disruption may be orchestrated by one or
multiple firms, often involving firms (e.g. start-ups) external to the field, the impact on value
creation is systemic (Skog et al., 2018).
2.2.2 Disruptions in market demand and supply. Operations and supply-chain
management research also make the distinction between demand-side (market-demand) and
supply-side disruptions. However, their notion diverges notably from the views of
management and strategy scholars, as it builds on the common use of the verb disrupt,
whichmeans “to prevent something, especially a system, process, or event, from continuing as
usual or as expected” (Cambridge Online Dictionary, 2020). Accordingly, disruptions are
caused by random events, which disrupt the operation of the supply chain/network. They are
difficult to foresee and are not necessarily related to technology or innovation in any way (e.g.
natural disasters or socio-economic crises) (Oke and Gopalakrishnan, 2009). Market-demand
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This demand-side disruption may be limited to a very specific segment or product category
(e.g. the sudden drop in beef demand caused by the outbreak of mad cow disease), or it may
have much broader implications, such as the global market disruptions caused by the 2008
financial crisis (Wang et al., 2017). In the case of (market) supply-side disruption, “random
events cause the supply chain/network to stop functioning, either completely or partially, for a
(typically random) amount of time” (Snyder et al., 2016). The negative impact of quarantines
caused by the Covid-19 outbreak on manufacturing supply chains is a recent example of this
kind of disruption (Haren and Simchi-Levi, 2020). Since market disruptions may have a severe
impact on company operations and the entire supply network, market disruptionmanagement
has received notable attention from both academics and practitioners (e.g. Snyder et al., 2016).
2.2.3 Institutional and systems perspective on disruption. In contrast to technological,
managerial and market-driven approaches, the research streams of organizational
institutionalism and socio-technical systems have taken a broader view to studying
disruption. Although institutional scholars consider disruptive events (e.g. technological
discontinuity) catalysts of change (e.g. Hardy andMaguire, 2008), they argue that attributing
the change to a single event or “jolt” leads to a flawed and simplified understanding of the
process (Munir, 2005). Institutions are defined as complex social structures comparable to
“rules of the game providing stability and meaning to social behaviour” (Scott, 1995, p. 33).
For example, the disruption resulting from Uber’s digital platform is caused not only by
disruptive technology, but first and foremost by institutional change, which is referred to as
institutional disruption (Laurell and Sandstr€om, 2016). It is argued that platform-based
disruptions are a specific pattern of disruption, which fundamentally alter the industry’s
institutionalized value creation logic. This perspective has recently become increasingly
important as its effects often extend well-beyond industry boundaries, thereby enabling deep
societal change (Sampere, 2016; Skog et al., 2018).
The research stream of socio-technical transitions (e.g. Geels, 2004; Geels and Schot, 2007)
focuses on the interplay between disruptive (niche) innovation, institutions and macro-level
disruptive forces (Urbinati et al., 2018). It explains howmanypotentially disruptive innovations
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fail by introducing path-breaking value propositions that are in conflict with the prevailing
rules of the game that are sustained by incumbents (e.g. Walrave et al., 2018). Sometimes,
however, major landscape (macro) level trends (e.g. demographic or geopolitical) and/or
exogenous shocks (e.g. wars or economic crises) destabilize the prevailing institutional setting
and open up a window of opportunity for niche innovations to breakthrough (Geels, 2018).
Thereby, disruption is seen as a complex process that cannot be controlled by a single actor.
From this perspective, disruptive innovation theory relies on too narrow a conception of both
disruption and innovation for it to help thinking about major societal disruptions such as low-
carbon transitions (McDowall, 2018) or autonomous vehicles (Skeete, 2018).
2.3 Theoretical perspectives on strategies to manage disruptions
Although incumbent responses to disruptions have attracted scholarly interest for decades,
the body of knowledge is still fragmented. This section aims to describe and summarize (see
Table 2) discussions about disruption management strategies under different research
streams.
Repositioning strategies can be seen as a classic incumbent response to disruptions. The
early disruptive innovation literature focused extensively on how incumbents (should)
respond to a threat posed by disruptive entrants who introduce technological innovations
mainly to the low-end market or by establishing a new market (e.g. Christensen, 1997).
Incumbents are forced to reposition themselves in the market when they are faced with
disruption, often by surprise. Kilkki et al. (2018) observe that the incumbent has a strategic
choice to reposition itself in themarket by (1) moving upwards to high-end customers in order
to avoid low-end disruptors (which is what the original disruption theory actually predicts);
(2) moving downwards to low-end customers in order to avoid high-end disruptors with
superior quality and (3) completely retreating from the market.
Incumbents may also respond to unexpected innovation by a new entrant by improving,
redefining or extending their existing business. This can be done by investing in existing
capabilities to extend performance on the current trajectory (Adner and Snow, 2010),
redefining the meanings and values associated with legacy technology (Raffaelli, 2019) or
acquiring entrants to prevent competition (Christensen et al., 2015). Incumbents may try to
protect their business from innovations that break traditional value chains by regulating or
penalizing attempts to bypass part of the value chain, for instance (Teixeira and Jamieson,
2014). When protection is not an option, they may adapt their business models in response
either to a specific entrant or to the overall industry transformation (Cozzolino et al., 2018).
Eventually, if an incumbent’s position regarding new innovation is disadvantageous, it is
also considered a strategic option not to respond to disruption at all. Incumbentsmay thereby
continue in the old way for as long as possible before winding down the business in a
controlled way (Gans, 2016b; Kilkki et al., 2018).
Strategies building on radical innovation have been extensively researched, especially in
the stream of innovation management research. Radical innovation can be viewed through
various complementary lenses such as technology, businessmodel, value creation network or
institutions and incumbents may pursue radical change even if it may cannibalize their own
business. However, Gilbert (2001) emphasizes the importance of cognitive framing in
decoupling the threat of core business from opportunity of the innovation. Radical
innovations may be developed within an integrated internal innovation unit (Iansiti et al.,
2003), an autonomous unit that is integrated later if successful (Christensen, 1997;
Christensen et al., 2015), by partnering with start-up companies that are developing
potentially disruptive innovations (Ansari and Krop, 2012; Kumaraswamy et al., 2018)
or in active co-operation with partners in innovation ecosystems (Beltagui et al., 2020;
Kumaraswamy et al., 2018).
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Category Strategy Description Selected reference(s)
Repositioning High-end strategya Move upwards to high-end customers
who demand higher quality
Kilkki et al. (2018)
Low-end strategy Move downwards to battle with lower
price and quality
Kilkki et al. (2018)
Retreat Reposition old technology / solution to
new demand environment
Adner and Snow (2010)





Continue in old way as long as
possible




Aggressively invest in existing






Redefining the meanings and values
associated with the legacy technology





Business model adaption of
incumbent by finding new ways of
creating and capturing value (after
disruption in the industry)
Cozzolino et al. (2018)
Gluing back the value
chain
Protecting or preventing entrants
from breaking the value chain (e.g.





Reproduction and strengthening of
prevailing institutions that are










Wait until (disruptive) technology
converges on a dominant feature and
then respond with an internal




et al. (2015), Iansiti et al.
(2003)
Internal innovation
units, teams and spin-
offs
Radical innovations developed within
integrated innovation unit,
autonomous innovation unit (within
organization) or in spin-off tasked to
develop and commercialize new
innovations








Radical (pre-emptive) renewal of the







Envision change and devise
strategies to break the rules of the
game (often linked to business model
innovation)
Battilana et al. (2009)
Co-operating with
disruptive entrants
Active co-operation with a number of
potential entrants (e.g. partnering or
technology licensing)
Christensen et al. (2018)
Co-operating with
disruptive entrants –
wait and buy up
Wait for the disruptive events/
technologies to take shape and then







Active co-operation with partners in
innovation ecosystems













In addition to understanding available responses, there is also prominent research on why
incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovations seem to vary significantly. Charitou and
Markides (2003) claim that how a company responds depends on two main factors:
motivation to respond and ability to respond. Motivation to respond is identified to be
dependent, for example, on strategic and structural context, outside influences and perceived
financial attractiveness of the opportunity (Madjdi and H€usig, 2011a, b). Bockm€uhl et al.
(2011) analyse responses to disruption in dental lab industry and divide responses based on
their intensity and timeliness. The intensity of the response is identified to be dependent
mainly on, opportunity framing, openness of workforce and organizational flexibility,
whereas the timeliness of response depends mostly on market sensitivity, opportunity
framing andmanagement flexibility (i.e. the ability of decision makers to modify their mental
models on a timely basis). A study in the context of publishing houses by Kammerlander et al.
(2018) proposes that domain and role identities are key determinants defining the response to
disruption. These identities may define whether incumbent firms adopt disruption, how
quickly they react to it and innovativeness of their response.
Strategies to “insure” companies against disruptions are very different from previously
described strategies, and those can be seen as a way to improve the ability to respond to
disruption. These strategies are often based on building a flexible and integrated company
structure that can absorb and integrate new innovations into the company as effectively as
possible (Gans, 2016b). They have been widely studied under several lines of theoretical
discussion that look at the phenomenon from slightly different perspectives: absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt andMartin, 2000) and
creative accumulation (Bergek et al., 2013). Based on these theories, it is suggested that
incumbents can manage disruptive innovations by taking advantage of external knowledge,
resources and talent and by developing integrative capabilities (e.g. cross-functional teams)
that can simultaneously handle both old and new technology (Gans, 2016).




Absorb and integrate Building a thoroughly integrated,
flexible organization which is able to
absorb and integrate external
resources and to quickly shift
production and organization
processes
Bergek et al. (2013;
Cohen and Levinthal
(1990), Gans (2016),




Owning complementary assets that
are crucial for business no matter the
product or architecture
Gans (2016)
Introduce a platform Utilize platform to maintain desired
social order which serves as a
“constitution” for entire ecosystem





Build strong corporate identity, for
example, in the form of a clear and
abstract understanding of what the
company is offering to its customers
Gans (2016)
Robustness Building a capability to mitigate
potential disruptions and maintain
performance level
Behzadi et al. (2018)
Resilience Building the firm’s capability to be
alert to, adapt to and quickly respond
to and recover from changes brought
about by a market disruption
Ambulkar et al. (2015)
Note(s): aChristensen et al. (1997) considers this a strategy that leads to disruptionTable 2.
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Other insurance strategies include owning key complementary assets or a strong
corporate brand (Gans, 2016b). These strategies are well aligned with platform leadership
strategy (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Perrons, 2009), in which the incumbent controls the
platform to maintain the desired social order which serves as a “constitution” for the entire
ecosystem (Hinings et al., 2018), thereby making it difficult to replace the ecosystem leader.
However, Gans (2016a) argues that relying on complementary assets or brand should be seen
only as a strategy to buy time – eventually the incumbent will have to be able to absorb the
new innovations, or risk being erased by waves of disruptions.
Operations management scholars have extensively studied disruptions in the
manufacturing industry. However, they take a different view from mainstream disruptive
innovation research and mainly focus on strategies for managing supply chain and market
demand disruptions. The major difference compared to managing disruptive innovations
stems from the temporary nature of disruptions. Incumbents’ response strategies are based
on building robustness to disruptions and so ensuring that they are able to mitigate realized
risks and maintain their performance level under disruption (Behzadi et al., 2018). Since it is
not possible to mitigate all disruptions, the company will need the resilience to adapt or
survive until the disruption is over and recover as quickly as possible (e.g. Ivanov et al., 2016).
The potential permanent impacts of market demand and supply disruptions are linked, for
example, to shifts in customer preferences, breakthroughs of innovative production
processes or shifts in market dynamics, but these are quite rarely discussed (e.g. Lin
et al., 2015).
Institutional and socio-technical perspectives provide lenses to explore disruption as a
complex societal phenomenon. They help to understand the difficulties that incumbents face
in responding to shifts in the institutional setting (see Chesbrough, 2001) and how to devise
strategies concerning institutional disruption. The agency perspective on institutional change
highlights the possibility that actors can take an active role either to maintain prevailing
institutions (Blanc and Huault, 2014) or to initiate and enact institutional change (e.g.
Battilana et al., 2009). Accordingly, actors can envision change and devise strategies to break
the rules of the game (e.g. regulations, norms and cultural-cognitive patterns) in order to give
rise to market disruptions. The socio-technical transitions perspective, then, is concerned
with how niche innovators (e.g. start-ups) build disruptive innovations within technological
or market niches that are initially protected against mainstream market selection (Geels and
Schot, 2007). Incumbents can also disrupt the market by developing novelties within niches
that act as “incubation rooms”. Nevertheless, if innovation is not compatible with the
prevailing socio-technical regime, incumbents will also require help from the landscape-level
forces that destabilize institutional arrangements and create pressure for change.
2.4 Research gap
Although our review found quite an extensive amount of research related to disruption, it
confirms previously identified research gaps. First, there is significant need to move from a
siloed descriptive theories, which are relatively limited in scope, to a more broadly
explanatory causal theory of innovation and competition (Ansari and Krop, 2012;
Christensen et al., 2018). Traditional disruptive innovation theory focuses mainly on low-
end and new-market disruptions, even though digitalization is profoundly challenging old
taken-for-granted rules, and several macro-level trends are shaping the landscape for
innovations that enable major socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2018). As a result, many
traditional businesses and sectors may be threatened (Hinings et al., 2018a; Skog et al., 2018).
However, studies in themanufacturing sector often focus on a single source of disruption, and





Second, our review is coherent with the argument that disruptive innovation theory offers
detailed insights on how to respond to a few specific disruption patterns, but the theory is
“mostly empty-handed when it comes to proposing solutions” (Christensen et al., 2018). Most
of the studies focus on incumbents’ adaptation to disruption or simply their survival, even
though understanding a broader range of incumbent outcomes would be highly beneficial
(Ansari and Krop, 2012; Cozzolino et al., 2018). Furthermore, the boundary between
competition and co-operation between incumbents and entrants has become increasingly
blurry when business is conducted within multi-sided platforms and ecosystems. Hence,
companies have to balance simultaneously between multiple strategic choices with
conflicting demands (Ansari et al., 2016; Rosli et al., 2017).
This article aims to answer to the call for more careful empirical analysis and more in-
depth exploration of response strategies (Christensen et al., 2018) by shedding light on how
top executives in manufacturing corporations perceive disruptions and what they consider
appropriate responses to those disruptions. Specifically, we aim to answer to following
research questions:
RQ1.What forms of disruption are the priority for top executives of large manufacturing
companies?
RQ2.What strategies do they consider appropriate in managing potential disruptions?
3. Methodology
3.1 Perspective and research design
This research was conducted using the basic principles of abductive reasoning, a process of
discovery based on the interaction of theory and practice, and of researcher and research
objects (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Qualitative research following the principles of abductive
reasoning was deemed suitable for the study for the following reasons. First, while specific
sources of disruption and strategic responses to them have been addressed in the literature,
broader examinations that include multiple overlapping disruptive forces are lacking. To
address this shortcoming, we prioritized exploratory qualitative inquiry that is open for
emerging findings. Second, the abductive analytical strategy allows us to refine the data-
driven observations with insights from existing theory and increase the theoretical relevance
of the findings. This process enables reasoning the best explanations for how executives of
manufacturing companies perceive disruptive opportunities and threats and how they
manage them. Thereby, although the research was guided by disruptive innovation theory,
the authors used an inductive approach to structure the data and combined the emerging
findings with existing constructs from theory.
3.2 Research setting
To ensure a degree of transferability for the findings, we focused on large manufacturing
companies in one country (Finland). At the time of the study, digital disruption, in particular,
was an important topic in the manufacturing industry, and we saw large companies with a
good overlook of disruptive forces within their industry. To sample companies, we consulted
the Federation of Finnish Technology Industries. The companies were drawn from five
subsectors of the biggest manufacturing sector in Finland, themachinery andmetal products
industry, as categorized by Statistics Finland using the following NACE Rev.2 classes:
(1) 25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
(2) 28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
(3) 29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
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(4) 30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
(5) 33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
Based on employee count, we then listed the 20 biggest companies with international
operations and identified and contacted topmanagers.We ended upwith 15 informants from
10 companies. Most of the informants were directors of business divisions; some had major
roles with a R&D, marketing or IT emphasis. Their titles included head of business unit/line,
head of strategy, director of sales and marketing and director of business development. All
informants were confident in discussing disruptions in their industry. Seven of the
corporations had headquarters in Finland and threewere headquartered in another European
country.
3.3 Data collection and analysis
The data were collected in 15 focused interviews between June and September 2019. Each
interview lasted from 30 to 60 min. List of the interviewees is included in the Appendix. The
interviews covered four themes: (1) competitiveness and renewal of Finnish manufacturing
industry, (2) disruption and transformation, (3) barriers and challenges for organizational
renewal and responding to disruptions and (4) elements supporting renewal and responses.
The interview themes are in line with our aim to investigate various disruptive forces and
response strategies broadly, without focusing on single sources of disruptions and their
effects.
The data were initially analysed independently by three researchers using descriptive and
simultaneous coding methods (Salda~na, 2009). After the initial coding, the researchers used
the pattern coding method (Salda~na, 2009) to reveal patterns in the codes. During data
collection and analysis the researchers wrote analytic memos with a view to fostering
reflection about the data and synthesizing data into higher-level analytic meanings (Miles
et al., 2014). In the analysis phase, we focused on two main areas. First, what kind of
disruptions do the topmanagers foresee to influence their industry.We identified a number of
sources of disruption from the data and categorized them into four groups (Figure 1). The
categorization was influenced by extant theory on disruptions (Table 1) as our empirical
findings supported them to a large extent. To achieve a good fit with our data, we combined
some disruption types from the literature and named them appropriately. Our second focus
area concerned howmanagers acknowledged sources of disruptions in their strategic choices.
Likewise, we sought insights from existing theory, including Table 2, and formulated eight
response strategies (Figure 2). We further identified that some of the strategies resembled
each other in that they addressed specific strategic issues such as ecosystems and stance on
new entrants in an industry. We revisited the literature and found that the distinction
between exploitation and exploitation, introduced by March (1991), provided a way to
classify the strategies into two groups based on whether they rely on exploiting existing
strengths or exploring new opportunities. Consequently, we arranged the strategies as four
exploitation–exploration pairs, where each pair depicted two alternative approaches to a
disruption-related strategic issue.
4. Findings
According to the interviewees, incumbents prepare for potential disruptions especially at the
executive team level and/or during the long-term strategic planning process. They discuss a
wide variety of disruptive technologies, forces and trends, and identify the impact of these
disruptive forces on several levels. In the following, we introduce the types of disruptions
perceived by the interviewees and then describe “archetypal” disruption management




4.1 Types of disruptions expected in the manufacturing industry
4.1.1 Disruptive technologies and innovations.
[Disruption] forces you to think about your own business from the outside. It helps you see if you’ve
been doing something for too long and have become too content with yourself. . . it may reveal that
something is bubbling beneath the surface, a much cheaper solution that is not as good but good
enough, and it kind of sneaks in while we are seriously downplaying its odds, and suddenly we
realize it has passed us by. . .
This excerpt is an example of general awareness about the possibility of low-end niche
innovations. The intervieweeswere not, however, particularly concerned about niche innovations
being hidden from their sight. Their technological concerns were focused on well-known
trajectories and particularly on the timing and wide-scale diffusion of breakthrough innovations.
Two main fields of technologies were of particular interest: emerging energy technologies
and information and communication technologies (ICTs). Innovations labelled under energy
technology are important in manufacturing companies, which require large amounts of
energy for their production processes and which are facing increasing pressure to improve
their environmental performance. Specific technologies mentioned by the interviewees
include energy harvesting and storage, renewable energy sources and alternative fuels. Some
of these disruptions are based on breakthroughs in basic sciences such as chemistry, which
might change the relative profitability of different technologies.
Many ICT-enabled disruptions also depend on fundamental breakthroughs. In particular,
artificial intelligence is expected to enable numerous data-driven innovations and industry
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sources for technological disruptions, such as 3D printing, blockchain, connectivity
technologies (e.g. 5G), digital platforms and augmented reality.
The wide-scale use of 3D printing could radically change the way that material flows are handled
globally . . . 3D printing could redefine the comparative profitability of production in low-cost
countries and shipping these products long distances.
4.1.2 Disruptions caused by failure to change. The interviewees reported that they had an
abundance of ideas for radical innovations, but the main challenge seemed to be how to
allocate scarce resources for innovation endeavours, which are somewhat disconnected from
daily business operations and entail high risks. This challenge was highlighted by a
respondent who claimed that disruptive technologies originate almost solely from
breakthroughs in basic science and engineering. Employees and innovation teams with
the resources and capabilities to make such innovations are rare but critical.
Physics and chemistry determine 99% whether the technology will work . . . Deep engineering
competencies determine whether it [the next disruptive technology] comes from our company or
from somewhere else.
Many interviewees considered the ability of organizations to integrate state-of-the-art
technologies into their processes and practices more important than initiating disruption in
the field. For example, industry 4.0 and digitalization were seen asmust-win battles requiring
the ability to learn and integrate new technologies. Incumbents’ (in)ability to absorb new
technologies and competencies was thought to depend, for example, on re-skilling existing
staff, recruiting new competencies and leadership. Automation and digitalization have also
fostered new ways of organizing value creation. Digital platforms alter structures of
traditional pipeline businesses, and manufacturing companies face new competition from
major ICT corporations that have superior capabilities in data analytics, for example.
4.1.3 Market-demand and supply disruptions.
Industry growth is an enabler for innovation. In one of ourmain segments demand dropped 80% in a
year, which also had a major negative impact on the R&D budget and activities.
Some interviewees mentioned disruptions in market demand and supply as major sources of
temporary, but sometimes also permanent disruption. One interviewee described how their
field of operations had been disrupted by long-term changes in customer needs and
behaviour (digitalization), causing a declining trend in paper demand.
. . .we have a concrete example of this transformation among our customers. Demand for our product
has declined for many years in a row, even by more than 10% a year. And every year we’re losing
customers due to factory closedowns. Our disruption has been the change in what we need to produce.
Other interviewees described disruptions caused by non-technical market and political
factors that impact the competitive environment, international trade and geopolitical
situation. For example, a sharp drop in the international price of a specific rawmaterial could
generate a major disruption. Falling raw material prices may initiate a chain reaction within
the industry and significantly reduce the profitability of production and therefore the demand
for machinery. A sudden trade war was mentioned as another disruptive event:
At the moment the trade war (between US and China) is a disruptive factor that you have to follow
carefully. We must think of how to adapt if this or that happens. . .
Asian countries and China in particular were considered “disruptors” by interviewees from
two companies whose business was increasingly challenged by Asian competitors. Chinese




market shares. Here, the source of disruption is a continuous change in the relative strength of
nations in international trade. In thewords of one interviewee: “if they continue to take over the
market with the same force, we are going to have to find a new way of operating”. Hence, this
ongoing market disruption may force the company to rethink its long-term strategy.
4.1.4 Institutional disruptions and systemic shifts. Institutional disruption means radically
changing the informal (e.g. normative ways of doing things) and formal (e.g. regulations) rules
of the game. This challenge is visible in 3D printing that was considered a potential source for a
major disruption. The technology itself is not disruptive if it is not accompaniedwith newways
of working and new business logics. The innovation has to be institutionalized in industry
practices and processes and accepted by customers before a disruption takes place.
We have many examples in our industry of solutions that use AI, machine learning and analytics, but
they are still very distinct from the core business,which is conducted in the sameway it has been always
been conducted. Nobody has thought about how this technology should change our conventions.
Changing the informal rules requires that old taken-for-granted beliefs, practices andprocesses are
deinstitutionalized. This was considered a major challenge among conservative customers. The
interviewees pointed out that despite efforts to encourage customers to adopt innovations, the slow
speed of change was experienced as a real challenge. Therefore, managers need to find ways to
overcome the inertia in changing customers’mind-set andbehaviour in these traditional industries.
Changes in laws and regulations, particularly the recent tightening of national and
international environmental laws, were considered “clearly a major disruptive force”. This
institutional disruption provided an opportunity for companies that had anticipated
regulative changes in response to long-term landscape-level changes such as climate change
and increasing sustainability demands. Green-tech solutions, for example, may see improved
profitability, which would bring a great boost to forerunners in the field. Regulative changes
may also force technology suppliers to move towards more sustainable technologies. As the
old technologies become obsolete, companies that have taken proactive actions will be in a
strong position in the altered market. Those not prepared will need capabilities to absorb and
integrate new knowledge fast enough to stay in the game regulated by new rules.
4.2 Strategies to manage disruptions
In this section, we outline the main disruption management strategies employed by the
interviewed managers. We also elaborate the rationale with which the strategy aims to deal
with disruption. For the sake of simplicity, each category of strategies is divided into two
somewhat opposing ends, which are based on different sets of assumptions about the
disruption. Drawing from March (1991), these categories are:
(1) Exploitation strategies that build on the assumption that the incumbent has built a
business that is highly valuable to them and that a disruption is a threat to the
continuity of the business. Hence, the aim is to exploit the business opportunity to the
fullest while protecting the business from the disruption.
(2) Exploration strategies that build on the assumption that the company can either
independently or with the help of others explore radical innovations that disrupt the
business. Hence, the assumption is that major changes are inevitable and that the
company has to be active in initiating change.
4.2.1 Internal development efforts. Most of the reported internal development efforts were
focused on incremental technological innovations following the existing innovation
trajectory rather than on path-breaking innovations that would also undermine the
existing business. The main challenge is to stay at the leading edge of the existing trajectory,
but at the same time to retain one’s ability to respond to any arising disruptions.
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4.2.1.1 Strengthen existing capabilities. The interviewees reported a tendency to focus on
exploiting existing competencies by improving and developing current products and
services. The reasoning is that bymaking sure their core competencies are strong, companies
are in a better position to withstand potential disruptions. One interviewee commented that
many companies do not innovate at all, reflecting a view that major investments for
breakthrough innovations are unnecessary. Some manufacturing industry products are
substantial investments: the delivery of heavy machinery may take up to 18 months. Given
the slow pace of industrial change in some areas, focusing on further developing the
company’s existing strengths may be an attractive strategy. This is not to say that such a
strategy is not debated. Another informant provided a critical assessment of their
development activities by referring to McKinsey’s three horizons model (2009) that
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We have a horizon 1 perspective, horizon 2 at most, but we think very little about horizon 3.We have
invested in innovation, but some things have proceeded slowly because our focus has been on the
here and now.
It might be possible to explain away the focus on incremental innovation on grounds
of organizational inertia. Our assessment is, however, that for some top managers it is a
deliberate strategic choice. One manager emphasized that it is important to invest in
new business areas at the right time, indicating that there may be disadvantages to
being a first mover. Another interviewee rated their capability to develop disruptive
innovations as low, but thought the same was true of their competitors as well. Some new
technologies, such as the use of digital twins, were considered to be groundbreaking
but competence-enhancing in that they may reinforce existing strengths rather than
undermine them.
4.2.1.2 Invest in radical innovation. In addition to seeing disruptions as a threat, some
companies investmore heavily in developing potentially disruptive innovations. Their goal is
to identify “disruptive opportunities” and to proactively develop innovations to seize them.
One interviewee described their emphasis on radical innovation:
We are a small player in the bigger market picture, but we are the market leader in our own niche . . .
We’ve been a disruptor for the big players in this market for 25 years now.
The goals of organizational units or innovation teams aiming to develop potentially
disruptive innovations lie far ahead in the future. Although companies do not always talk
about deliberate innovation strategies, many of them clearly define a long-term business
vision where innovation has a crucial role. In contrast to a three-year time horizon for
business strategy, visions for radical innovation activities can be set for 10 or even
15 years.
Our vision is to be a global leader in X and we expect this to be realized within 10 years at the latest.
That’s far away enough. We aim to achieve this through several strategy periods, counting
backwards what we need to achieve at a certain point in time to reach our long-term vision.
Innovation teams look into future business opportunities that are beyond the scope of current
business operations. They also follow new products, patents, emerging technologies and
design experiments. Some interviewees said their teams were adopting innovation practices
from the start-up world and aiming to speed up their experimentation cycles. Innovation
teams were allowed to study potential disruptions even when they conflicted with current
business operations:
We have a small research and innovation team exploring unknown paths. They’ll even look into
things that may cannibalize our own businesses. That is something our business units would
never do.
Sometimes the focus is at odds with the goals of the business unit, which may hamper the
adoption of innovations even within the company’s own organization.
We must be able to push new things to our business, even though they do not want it yet, but we
know it will eventually protect the future business.
4.2.2 Stance on new entrants. Companies have several strategic options available when it
comes to potential new entrants. On the one hand, companies may aim to protect their
existing offering against competing ones, but at the same time they may look out for new
entrants that might be beneficial for business renewal.
4.2.2.1 Creating entry barriers. Well-known strategies against entrants are based on
standardization, patenting and designing business models around assets that protect the
company against disruption. For example, many businesses may use standards and
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patents to slow down or prevent the entry of new entrants. However, this may also
encourage competitors to seek disruptive solutions that would make patents or standard
obsolete.
The interviewees reported having invested in assets such as global sales and delivery
networks, a highly specialized workforce, data analytics and production technologies. Some
took the view that hard-to-copy assets could act to deter new entrants. However, heavy
reliance on expensive assets may also attract disruptive innovations. A more advanced way
to protect the company’s business is to continuously adapt the business model to the
changing needs and business environment.
One of the perceived challenges with the protection strategy was that entrants
are not necessarily start-ups, but the threat may come from major players in other
industries. For example, deep knowledge about industrial processes and data acquired from
production were seen as protective assets that are hard for entrants to acquire. However,
when data analytics becomes a more integral part of the industry, it is uncertain whether
traditional players can sustain their competitive advantage over new rivals from the IT
industry, such as IBM, Google and Microsoft. One interviewee noted that these new
players are increasingly interested in the digitalization of the manufacturing industry,
and although they are currently lacking in industry knowledge, the question is for
how long.
4.2.2.2 Collaborating with new entrants. Incumbents increasingly regard start-up
co-operation as an opportunity rather than a threat. We found that manufacturing
companies have many forms of start-up co-operation. The interviewees described start-ups
as potential acquisition targets, or as partners with innovative ideas and prototypes that can
be exploited jointly. Many, however, give the impression that their company is somewhat
conservative in acquisitions, as the following quote illustrates:
We have bought a couple of start-ups, even though this is not our strategy. Our strategy is rather to
partner with companies who have new innovative thoughts that we can develop further together.
Themain reason for this is that the start-ups often have radically different ways of working
from the incumbents. Hence, integrating a start-up too early or too tightly is expected to be
harmful for an innovation. The incumbents, therefore, have to strike a balance between
start-up integration and autonomy to ensure both innovativeness and usefulness for the
company.
We should work more actively with start-ups, however, in such a way that we keep them separated
from the corporate world until we know they can fly. If we bring in a new idea or project into our
corporation too early, it will easily get suppressed by all the rules, tools and bureaucracy.
4.2.3 Ecosystem strategy.One of themainmechanisms that is expected to disrupt incumbents’
business is a new way of creating value that builds on restructuring the prevailing value
network. Many of the studied companies were actively trying to protect their future business
position by building platforms and related ecosystems. It is thought that the transformation
to a platform-based business is particularly difficult for incumbents who are used to dealing
with product-based competition andwho do not know how to react to platform competition at
an ecosystem level (Sampere, 2016).
4.2.3.1 Acquire a keystone position in business ecosystem.
The reason why our strategy focuses on participating in ecosystems as an owner or key partner is
that we would not be disrupted but we would be well positioned in the field.
As the excerpt indicates, some companies want to have a central or “keystone” position in the




the company the possibility to exercise strong influence over co-evolutionary processes in the
ecosystem (Moore, 1993). Hence, a specific company is vital for the survival of the business
ecosystem, making it difficult to replace. A keystone position may, however, turn into a
disadvantage. A single stakeholder dominating the business ecosystem may attract
disruptive innovations aimed at replacing the keystone firm and thereby the whole business
ecosystem around it.
4.2.3.2 Facilitating an innovation ecosystem. An alternative strategy is fostering the
growth of a more balanced innovation ecosystem, in which no single actor takes up the
keystone position. Some interviewees said that innovation ecosystems were strategically
important for adapting to disruptive innovations and also for proactively innovating to create
disruptions. These executives do not believe that their company can solve complex problems
on their own, but that disruptive innovations require strong partners around them. Although
the basic idea is that no-one can single-handedly control the innovation, some interviewees
prefer a central position in the ecosystem.
We have made the strategic decision to engage in research and technology development within the
ecosystem, which is the most effective way to get things done . . . Once we have a functioning
ecosystem we will, for example, purchase research directly from our ecosystem partners.
4.2.4 Strategies concerning institutional change. Industries are protected against radical
change by formal and informal institutions, which are constantly maintained and reproduced.
This is done by enforcing existing mental models, practices and conventions, thereby
sustaining the status quo beneficial for dominant players. Although a single stakeholder could
go against the institutional mainstream, it has limited means to permanently change
institutional structures. Nevertheless, a persistent and concerted effort by several actors can
eventually change institutions and enable the breakthrough of radical innovations.
4.2.4.1 Institutional maintenance. Even though institutional maintenance is not often
considered a deliberate strategy, it is a natural strategy choice for incumbents who benefit from
the statusquo. Some interviewees said this strategywas both a visible presence and challenging
in their work. For example, somemanufacturing companies operate inmarkets where the basic
principles of conducting business have remained relatively unchanged for a long time (e.g. steel
production and transporting goods around the globe). This may protect incumbents but also
make it challenging to have a critical conversation about potential disruptions.
In our industry it is very difficult to talk about disruption because someone will always bring the
discussion back to the point that “you cannot disrupt steel”.
Another example of institutional maintenance is the strengthening of the norms and
regulations for conducting business in a certain way. One interviewee said that the
foundation of their business was to provide professional maintenance services locally around
the globe and that the norm of conducting maintenance on-site protects them against
disruptors. Although the interviewee was aware of the remote maintenance trend, which is
expected to reduce the need for physical presence, it was still thought that building the
operation around a local workforce would be crucial well into the future.
This current [maintenance] work still relies quite a lot on a local workforce and there are not any
directly disruptive technologies on the horizon.
4.2.4.2 Institutional entrepreneurship. Maintaining current institutional arrangements
in order to provide protection against disruptions seems to be a challenging strategic
option in the long term. Upholding the status quo attracts innovators who are keen to
disrupt it. Therefore, incumbents are sometimes interested in institutional
entrepreneurship, even though that might have a negative impact on their current
business in the short term.
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Several interviewees said that out-of-the-box thinking and challenging conventions was a
necessity for radical renewal. Hiring people from the software industry, who do and see
things differently, was considered beneficial for organizational renewal. One interviewee
pointed out that high top management turnover is key to successful renewal. Inter-
organizational and international job rotation was also considered to positively influence
capabilities for radical renewal.
Our findings indicate that it is particularly difficult to change customers’ conventional
practices and rules prevalent in the markets. Some interviewees described situations where
they would be willing to take bigger leaps in introducing innovations if the market were
prepared for that. However, one interviewee said that, despite the slow speed of change, the
role of their company was to actively feed new ideas to their customers. Another informant
made the point that changing the rules of the game requires persistent efforts and a firm belief
in their long-term vision.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Although there is extensive literature on disruptive innovation, it is not often clear what kind
of strategies companies should adopt to survive or take advantage of forthcoming
disruptions (Christensen et al., 2018). Our study sheds light on this by drawing on an
empirical study in the context of manufacturing companies in Finland. We have three main
contributions.
First, by identifying types of disruptions expected by top manufacturing executives, we
envision a disruption landscape that is more complex than typically described in the
literature. The executives interviewed draw attention to multiple disruptive forces that have
varying degrees of urgency, salience and uncertainty. This forward-looking examination
contrasts with typical retrospective descriptions of disruptions, such as the classic examples
of disk drives and mini mills (Christensen, 1997) where it is possible to identify a single
defining source of disruption. We argue that as far as disruptions are concerned, companies
are often “driving through the fog” (cf. Day and Schoemaker, 2004). Their operating
environment is highly uncertain, elusive and emergent, and it is difficult to recognize and
react to strategic threats and opportunities before it is too late. Disruptions may also overlap,
with multiple distinct disruptions simultaneously affecting a single company. Further, a
single source of disruption may manifest itself in different forms. The COVID-19 pandemic,
for example, can be considered both a supply chain disruption and a demand disruption.
Besides, it is likely to induce temporary or permanent shifts in the broader institutional and
social regimes, which open up the possibility of other disruptions (e.g. technological
innovations).
Second, we paint a picture of companies’ strategic responses to disruptions, incorporating
the aforementioned characteristics that we suggest disruptions possess. The view of
disruptions as manifold and ambiguous forces that shape companies’ business environment
challenges the current understanding of what strategies to apply to manage them. Much of
the extant research describes settings where companies formulate deliberate responses to
clearly identified disruptions (Adner and Snow, 2010; Christensen, 1997; Christensen et al.,
2015). Our findings suggest that such responses are often unavailable. If a single disruption
cannot be identified as a priority, it is impossible to develop a specific response to address that
disruption. If multiple disruptions have to be addressed simultaneously, they may generate
conflicting demands that managers will have to balance. As a result, the strategies are likely
to be more generic than shifts from one customer segment to another (Kilkki et al., 2018).
When companies are in the dark about the strategic demands of the future, the critical
question becomes how they can develop their capabilities such that they are best positioned




Third, we identify four strategic dimensions that Finnish manufacturing companies
consider important in anticipating and responding to disruptions: internal development
efforts, stance on new entrants, ecosystems and institutional change.We furthermore make a
distinction between exploitative and explorative strategies (March, 1991). Exploitative
strategies build on competitive advantages and core competencies, whereas explorative
strategies aim to develop a company in a new direction. Interestingly, our findings show how,
in a slow-moving industry such as manufacturing, exploitative strategies are considered a
valid option for weathering upcoming disruptions. This contrasts with the general tendency
to recommend adaptation through organizational renewal and dynamic capabilities as the
strategy of choice for responding to disruptions (e.g. Karimi and Walter, 2015). This
discrepancy may be explained by the vantage point of the studied organizations and
managers regarding the timing of a disruption. If a disruption has already happened,
adaptation may be the only remaining choice. If it is being prepared for, other options such as
putting up defences may still be available.
Though excluded from closer scrutiny here, our study also points at four modes of
ambidexterity for managing disruptions. Previous research has identified organizational
ambidexterity as a potential solution to the threat of disruption (O’Reilly and Tushman,
2008, 2016). This line of research promotes the simultaneous implementation of exploitative
and explorative initiatives, typically regarding internal development efforts. Besides
internal development efforts, examination of the strategic dimensions identified in this
study opens up the possibility for other forms of ambidexterity as well. First, there may be
an ambidextrous approach to dealing with new entrants. Companies may both create
barriers to the entry of new companies and choose the best ones to collaborate with. This is
reminiscent of the approach used by technology giants such as Google and Apple, who
maintain strict control of their platforms while buying up innovative start-ups to boost
their innovation. Second, companies may leverage ecosystems with ambidexterity by
ensuring a keystone position in critical business ecosystems while collaborating in
different ecosystems for learning and innovation. The extant literature has identified a
distinction between business and innovation ecosystems (Clarysse et al., 2014), and
companies are known to simultaneously employ explorative and exploitative networks
(Kauppila, 2010), making an ambidextrous ecosystem strategy a viable option. Finally, by
engaging in both institutional maintenance and institutional entrepreneurship (Lawrence
and Suddaby, 2006), it may be possible to simultaneously submit to and exploit the
traditional norms and principles of the business and have a separate organization that is
encouraged to break prevailing rules of the game and explore the potential of new trends
with forerunner customers.
A key limitation of our study stems from the qualitative method and the focus on a limited
number of interviewees. Further, in aiming to characterize archetypal strategic orientations
in the industry, we did not investigate the explicitly stated strategies of individual companies.
Future research should investigate how these archetypes are manifested in strategy work
and its outcomes at the company level, and test the prevalence of various strategic
orientations in manufacturing industries and other contexts. Furthermore, we adopted an
anticipatory perspective, where the informants discussed preparation for future disruptions.
In the case of the emergence of a single high-priority disruption, strategic changes for
responding to that specific disruption are likely.
References
Adner, R. and Kapoor, R. (2016), “Innovation ecosystems and the pace of substitution: re-examining
technology S-curves”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 625-648.
EJIM
Adner, R. and Snow, D. (2010), “Old technology responses to new technology threats: demand heterogeneity
and technology retreats”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 19 No. 5, pp. 1655-1675.
Ambulkar, S., Blackhurst, J. and Grawe, S. (2015), “Firm’s resilience to supply chain disruptions: scale
development and empirical examination”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 33 No. 34,
pp. 111-122.
Ansari, S. and Krop, P. (2012), “Incumbent performance in the face of a radical innovation: towards a
framework for incumbent challenger dynamics”, Research Policy, Vol. 41 No. 8, pp. 1357-1374.
Ansari, S., Garud, R. and Kumaraswamy, A. (2016), “The disruptor’s dilemma: TIVO and the U.S
television ecosystem”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 1829-1853.
Battilana, J., Leca, B. and Boxenbaum, E. (2009), “How actors change institutions: towards a theory of
institutional entrepreneurship”, The Academy of Management Annals, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 65-107.
Behzadi, G., O’Sullivan, M.J., Olsen, T.L. and Zhang, A. (2018), “Allocation flexibility for agribusiness
supply chains under market demand disruption”, International Journal of Production Research,
Vol. 56 No. 10, pp. 3524-3546.
Beltagui, A., Rosli, A. and Candi, M. (2020), “Exaptation in a digital innovation ecosystem: the
disruptive impacts of 3D printing”, Research Policy, Vol. 49 No. 1, pp. 1-16.
Bergek, A., Berggren, C., Magnusson, T. and Hobday, M. (2013), “Technological discontinuities and
the challenge for incumbent firms: destruction, disruption or creative accumulation?”, Research
Policy, Vol. 42 Nos 6–7, pp. 1210-1224.
Blanc, A. and Huault, I. (2014), “Against the digital revolution? Institutional maintenance and artefacts
within the French recorded music industry”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change,
Vol. 83 No. 1, pp. 10-23.
Bockm€uhl, S., K€onig, A., Enders, A., Hungenberg, H. and Puck, J. (2011), “Intensity, timeliness, and
success of incumbent response to technological discontinuities: a synthesis and empirical
investigation”, Review of Managerial Science, Vol. 5 No. 4, pp. 265-289.
Cambridge Online Dictionary (2020), Available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/
disrupt (accessed 8 September 2020).
Charitou, C. and Markides, C. (2003), “Responses to disruptive strategic inniovation”, MIT Sloan
Management Review, Vol. 44 No. 2, p. 11.
Chase, R. (2016), “We need to expand the definition of disruptive innovation”, Harvard Business
Review, Vol. 4, p. 3.
Chesbrough, H.W. (2001), “Assembling the elephant: a review of empirical studies on the impact of
technical change upon incumbent firms”, in Chesbrough, H.W. and Burgelman, R.A. (Eds),
Comparative Studies of Technological Evolution, pp. 1-36.
Christensen, C.M. (1997), The Innovator’s Dilemma, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
Christensen, C.M. (2006), “The ongoing process of building a theory of disruption”, Journal of Product
Innovation Management, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 39-55.
Christensen, C.M. and Raynor, M.E. (2003), The Innovator’s Solution, Harvard Business School Press,
Boston, MA.
Christensen, C.M., Raynor, M. and McDonald, R. (2015), “What is disruptive innovation?”, Harvard
Business Review, December 2015, pp. 1-16.
Christensen, C.M., McDonald, R., Altman, E.J. and Palmer, J.E. (2018), “Disruptive innovation: an
intellectual history and directions for future research”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 55
No. 7, pp. 1043-1078.
Clarysse, B., Wright, M., Bruneel, J. and Mahajan, A. (2014), “Creating value in ecosystems: crossing the
chasm between knowledge and business ecosystems”, Research Policy, Vol. 43 No. 7, pp. 1164-1176.
Cohen, W. and Levinthal, D. (1990), “Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and




Cozzolino, A., Verona, G. and Rothaermel, F.T. (2018), “Unpacking the disruption process: new
technology, business models, and incumbent adaptation”, Journal of Management Studies,
Vol. 55 No. 7, pp. 1166-1202.
Cusumano, M.A., Yoffie, D.B. and Gawer, A. (2020), “The future of platforms”, MIT Sloan
Management Review, Vol. 61 No. 3, pp. 46-54.
Day, G.S. and Schoemaker, P.J. (2004), “Driving through the fog: managing at the edge”, Long Range
Planning, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 127-142.
Dubois, A. and Gadde, L.-E. (2002), “Systematic combining: an abductive approach to case research”,
Journal of Business Research, Vol. 55 No. 7, pp. 553-560, doi: 10.1016/S0148-2963(00)00195-8.
Eisenhardt, K. and Martin, J. (2000), “Dynamic capabilities: what are they?”, Strategic Management
Journal, Vol. 21 Nos 10/11, pp. 1105-1121.
Eggers, J.P. and Park, K.F. (2017), “Incumbent adaptation to technological change: the past, present,
and future of research on heterogeneous incumbent response”, Academy of Management
Annals, Vol. 12 No. 1.
Gans, J. (2016a), The Disruption Dilemma, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Gans, J. (2016b), “The other disruption”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 2016, pp. 2-8.
Gawer, A. and Cusumano, M.A. (2002), Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft and Cisco Drive
Industry Innovation, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
Gawer, A. and Cusumano, M.A. (2014), “Industry platforms and ecosystem innovation”, Journal of
Product Innovation Management, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 417-433.
Geels, F.W. (2004), “Understanding system innovations: a critical literature review and a conceptual
synthesis”, in Elzen, B., Geels, F.W. and Green, K. (Eds), System Innovation and the Transition
to Sustainability: Theory, Evidence and Policy, Edward Elgar.
Geels, F.W. (2018), “Disruption and low-carbon system transformation: progress and new challenges
in socio-technical transitions research and the multi-level perspective”, Energy Research and
Social Science, Vol. 37, pp. 224-231.
Geels, F.W. and Kemp, R. (2007), “Dynamics in socio-technical systems: typology of change processes
and contrasting case studies”, Technology in Society, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 441-455.
Geels, F.W. and Schot, J. (2007), “Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways”, Research Policy,
Vol. 36 No. 3, pp. 399-417.
Gilbert, C.G. (2001), “A dilemma in response: examining the newspaper industry’s response to the
Internet”, Academy of Management Proceedings, Vol. 2001 No. 1, p. 7.
Gobble, M.M. (2016), “Defining disruptive innovation”, Research-Technology Management, Vol. 59
No. 4, pp. 66-71.
Hagel, J., Brown, J.S. and Davison, L. (2008), “Shaping in a world of constant disruption”, Harvard
Business Review, Vol. 86 No. 10, p. 11.
Hardy, C. and Maguire, S. (2008), “Institutional entrepreneurship”, in Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Suddaby,
R. and Sahlin, K. (Eds), The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, pp. 262-280.
Haren, P. and Simchi-Levi, D. (2020), “How coronavirus could impact the global supply chain by mid-
March”, Harvard Business Review, February, pp. 2-7.
HBR (2015), “Tesla’s not as disruptive as you might think”, Harvard Business Review, May 2015,
pp. 22-23.
Henderson, R. (2006), “The innovator’s dilemma as a problem of organizational competence”, Journal
of Product Innovation Management, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 5-11.
Henderson, R. and Clark, K.B. (1990), “Architectural innovation: the reconfiguration of existing
product technologies and the failure of established firms”, Administrative Science Quarterly,
Vol. 35 No. 1, pp. 9-30.
EJIM
Hill, C.W.L. and Rothaermel, F.T. (2003), “The performance of incumbent firms in the face of radical
technological innovation”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 257-274.
Hinings, B., Gegenhuber, T. and Greenwood, R. (2018), “Digital innovation and transformation: an
institutional perspective”, Information and Organization, Vol. 28, pp. 52-61.
Hopp, C., Antons, D., Kaminski, J. and Salge, T.O. (2018), “The topic landscape of disruption research –
a call for consolidation, reconciliation, and generalization”, Journal of Product Innovation
Management, Vol. 35 No. 3, pp. 458-487.
Iansiti, M., McFarlan, F.W. and Westerman, G. (2003), “Leveraging the incumbent’s advantage”, MIT
Sloan Management Review, Vol. 44 No. 4, pp. 58-64.
Ivanov, D., Pavlov, A., Dolgui, A., Pavlov, D. and Sokolov, B. (2016), “Disruption-driven supply chain
(re)-planning and performance impact assessment with consideration of pro-active and recovery
policies”, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review,
Vol. 90, pp. 7-24.
Kaltenecker, N., Hess, T. and H€usig, S. (2015), “Managing potentially disruptive innovations in
software companies: transforming from on-premises to the on-demand”, The Journal of
Strategic Information Systems, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 234-250.
Kammerlander, N., K€onig, A. and Richards, M. (2018), “Why do incumbents respond heterogeneously
to disruptive innovations? The interplay of domain identity and role identity”, Journal of
Management Studies, Vol. 55 No. 7, pp. 1122-1165.
Karimi, J. and Walter, Z. (2015), “The role of dynamic capabilities in responding to digital disruption: a
factor-based study of the newspaper industry”, Journal of Management Information Systems,
Vol. 1, pp. 39-81.
Kauppila, O.P. (2010), “Creating ambidexterity by integrating and balancing structurally separate
interorganizational partnerships”, Strategic Organization, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 283-312.
Kilkki, K., M€antyl€a, M., Karhu, K., H€amm€ainen, H. and Ailisto, H. (2018), “A disruption framework”,
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 129, pp. 275-284.
Kumaraswamy, A., Garud, R. and Ansari, S. (2018), “Perspectives on disruptive innovations”, Journal
of Management Studies, Vol. 55 No. 7, pp. 1025-1042.
Laurell, C. and Sandstr€om, C. (2016), “Analysing uber in social media – disruptive technology or
institutional disruption?”, International Journal of Innovation Management, Vol. 20 No. 5, p. 19.
Lawrence, T.B. and Suddaby, R. (2006), “Institutions and institutional work”, in Clegg, S., Hardy, C.,
Lawrence, T.B. and Nord, W.R. (Eds), Handbook of Organization Studies, SAGE Publications,
London.
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992), “Core capabilities and core rigidities: a paradox in managing new product
development”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13, pp. 111-125.
Lin, B., Omoju, O.E. and Okonkwo, J.U. (2015), “Will disruptions in OPEC oil supply have permanent
impact on the global oil market?”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Vol. 52,
pp. 1312-1321.
Madjdi, F. and H€usig, S. (2011a), “The heterogeneity of incumbents’ perceptions and response
strategies in the face of potential disruptions”, Foresight, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 14-33.
Madjdi, F. and H€usig, S. (2011b), “The response strategies of incumbent mobile network operators on
the disruptive potential of public W-LAN in Germany”, Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 35
No. 6, pp. 555-567.
March, J.G. (1991), “Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning”, Organization Science,
Vol. 2, pp. 71-87.
Markides, C. (2006), “Disruptive innovation: in need of better theory”, Journal of Product Innovation
Management, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 19-25.
McDowall, W. (2018), “Disruptive innovation and energy transitions: is Christensen’s theory helpful?”,




McKinsey (2009), “Enduring ideas: the three horizons of growth”,McKinsey Quarterly, December 2009,
available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-
insights/enduring-ideas-the-three-horizons-of-growth.
Miles, M., Huberman, M. and Saldana, J. (2014), Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook,
3rd ed., Sage Publications, London.
Moore, J.F. (1993), “Predators and prey: a new ecology of competition”, Harvard Business Review,
May-June.
Munir, K.A. (2005), “The birth of the ‘Kodak moment’: institutional entrepreneurship and the adoption
of new technologies”, Organization Studies, Vol. 26 No. 11, pp. 1665-1687.
Oke and Gopalakrishnan (2009), “Managing disruptions in supply chains: a case study of a retail
supply chain”, International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 118 No. 1, pp. 168-174.
Oliver, C. (1992), “The antecedents of deinstitutionalization”, Organization Science, Vol. 13 No. 4,
pp. 563-588.
O’Reilly, C.A. and Tushman, M.L. (2008), “Ambidexterity as a dynamic capability: resolving the
innovator’s dilemma”, Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 28, pp. 185-206.
O’Reilly, C.A. and Tushman, M.L. (2016), Lead and Disrupt: How to Solve the Innovator’s Dilemma,
Stanford University Press, Redwood City, CA.
Perrons, R.K. (2009), “The open kimono: how Intel balances trust and power to maintain platform
leadership”, Research Policy, Vol. 38 No. 8, pp. 1300-1312.
Raffaelli, R. (2019), “Technology reemergence: creating new value for old technologies in Swiss
mechanical watchmaking, 1970–2008”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 64 No. 3,
pp. 576-618.
Rosli, A.A., Beltagui, A. and Candi, M. (2017), “Understanding disruption in innovation ecosystems: an
effectuation perspective”, Academy of Management Proceedings, No. 1, 16803.
Salda~na, J. (2009), The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, Sage Publications, London.
Sampere, J.P.V. (2016), “Why platform disruption is so much bigger than product disruption”, Harvard
Business Review, April 08 2016, pp. 1-6.
Schmidt, G. and Druehl, C. (2008), “When is a disruptive innovation disruptive?”, Journal of Product
Innovation Management, Vol. 25, pp. 347-369.
Scott, W.R. (1995), Institutions and Organizations, 1st ed., Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks,
California.
Shen, B. and Li, Q. (2017), “Market disruptions in supply chains: a review of operational models”,
International Transactions in Operational Research, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 697-711.
Skeete, J.-P. (2018), “Level 5 autonomy: the new face of disruption in road transport”, Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 134, pp. 22-34.
Skog, D.A., Wimelius, H. and Sandberg, J. (2018), “Digital disruption”, Business and Information
Systems Engineering, Vol. 60 No. 5, pp. 431-437.
Snyder, L.V., Atan, Z., Peng, P., Rong, Y., Schmitt, A.J. and Sinsoysal, B. (2016), “OR/MS models for
supply chain disruptions: a review”, IIE Transactions, Vol. 48 No. 2, pp. 89-109.
Sood, A. and Tellis, G.J. (2011), “Demystifying disruption: a new model for understanding and
predicting disruptive technologies”, Marketing Science, Vol. 30 No. 2, pp. 339-354.
Teixeira, T.S. and Jamieson, P. (2014), “The decoupling effect of digital disruptors”, Working paper 15-
031, Harvard Business School, 28 October.
Tushman, M.L. and Anderson, P. (1986), “Technological discontinuities and organizational
environments”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 439-465.
Urbinati, A., Chiaroni, D., Chiesa, V., Franzo, S. and Frattini, F. (2018), “An exploratory analysis on the
contextual factors that influence disruptive innovation: the case of uber”, International Journal
of Innovation and Technology Management, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 1-26.
EJIM
Utterback, J.M. (1994),Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation: How Companies Can Seize Opportunities
in the Face of Technological Change, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, p. 253.
Utterback, J.M. and Acee, H.J. (2005), “Disruptive technologies: an expanded view”, International
Journal of Innovation Management, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 1-17.
Walrave, B., Talmar, M., Podoynitsyna, K.S., Romme, A.G.L. and Verbong, G.P.J. (2018), “A multi-level
perspective on innovation ecosystems for path-breaking innovation”, Technological Forecasting
and Social Change, Vol. 136, pp. 103-113.
Wang, J.C., Wang, Z., Wang, Y.Y. and Lai, F. (2017), “Impacts of information reliability in a supply
chain with market disruption risks”, International Transactions in Operational Research, Vol. 24
No. 4, pp. 737-761.
Webb, A. (2020), “The 11 sources of disruption every company must monitor”, MIT Sloan
Management Review, Vol. 61 No. 3, pp. 65-70.
Weeks, M.R. (2015), “Is disruption theory wearing new clothes or just naked? Analyzing recent
critiques of disruptive innovation theory”, Innovation: Management, Policy and Practice, Vol. 17
No. 4, pp. 417-428.
Yoo, Y., Lyytinen, K., Thummadi, V. and Weiss, A. (2010), “Unbounded innovation with digitalization:
a case of digital camera”, Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, pp. 1-41.
Yu, D. and Hang, C.C. (2010), “A reflective review of disruptive innovation theory”, International
Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 435-452.
Appendix
Corresponding author
Arto Wallin can be contacted at: arto.wallin@vtt.fi
For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
Interviewee # Company Date Position
1 A 19.8.2019 President, Business area
2 B 20.8.2019 Director, R&D
3 C 4.7.2019 Executive Vice President, Business area
4 C 9.8.2019 Executive Vice President, Business area
5 C 30.8.2019 Executive Vice President, Technology
6 D 15.8.2019 Director, Business development
7 E 14.9.2019 Director, Business development
8 F 12.8.2019 President, Digital business
9 G 4.9.2019 Vice President, Marketing
10 H 29.8.2019 Director, Business Development
11 I 4.7.2019 President, Business area
12 I 2.7.2019 Executive Vice President, Strategy
13 I 2.7.2019 President, Digital business
14 J 10.9.2019 Vice President, Business area
15 J 13.6.2019 Director, Strategy
Table A1.
List of interviewees
Disruption and
manufacturing
executives
